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Abstract—Detection rules have traditionally been de-
signed for rational agents that minimize the Bayes risk
(average decision cost). With the advent of crowd-sensing
systems, there is a need to redesign binary hypothesis
testing rules for behavioral agents, whose cognitive be-
havior is not captured by traditional utility functions such
as Bayes risk. In this paper, we adopt prospect theory
based models for decision makers. We consider special
agent models namely optimists and pessimists in this
paper, and derive optimal detection rules under different
scenarios. Using an illustrative example, we also show
how the decision rule of a human agent deviates from the
Bayesian decision rule under various behavioral models,
considered in this paper.
Index Terms—Binary Hypothesis Testing, Prospect
Theory, Optimists, Pessimists.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive behavior has traditionally been modeled
using rationality models, where the human agents are
assumed to behave in an unbiased manner. Unbiased
decision-makers are often assumed to minimize Bayes
risk, which is defined as the expected cost of making
decisions [1]. However, in the real world, human agents
may have a cognitive bias, due to the limited availability
of information and/or other complex behaviors such as
emotions, loss-aversion and endowment effect [2]–[6].
Such complex agents were successfully modeled by
Kahneman and Tversky using prospect theory in [3],
where human behavior is modeled using weight and
value functions over probabilities and costs respectively.
In this paper, we derive optimal decision rules for
binary hypothesis testing employed by two special
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prospect-theory based human agents, namely optimists
and pessimists.
In the past, several efforts have been geared towards
validating theoretical models to comprehend decision
rules employed by human agents, using experimental
data. Recently, researchers have been showing sig-
nificant interest in the design of complex networked
systems where human agents interact with machines
effectively so that the system operates with maximal
efficiency [7]. Particularly, in the context of binary
hypothesis testing, there are several crowdsensing based
applications such as Tomnod and Zooniverse where
human volunteers participate in the decision-making
process of a proposed task. In some cases, systems
are designed to emulate human behavior in order to
reduce human effort and intervention. One example is
the design of self-driving cars by Google and Uber,
which move in traffic alongside human-driven vehicles.
In contrast, there are other applications where there
is a need to steer/nudge human decisions in order to
improve the overall performance of the system [8]. In
this paper, we study optimal behavioral rules in human
agents within the context of binary hypothesis testing,
which is essential to propose a design framework, where
human decisions can be either emulated/steered in a
controlled manner in any human-machine interaction
system.
Traditionally, binary hypothesis testing has been ex-
tensively studied by researchers over several decades
under different scenarios [1], [9]. In particular, Bayesian
detection rules are designed under the premise that
the decision-maker is rationally motivated to minimize
its Bayes risk. With the advent of novel systems
which include human decision makers, there is a need
to redesign detection systems with human decision-
makers. Design of such systems has gained interest,
some of such studies are discussed below. In [10],
Rhim et al. have modeled the problem of distributed
hypothesis testing as a categorical decision-making
problem. Inspired from the observation that human
agents make decisions categorically, the authors have
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Fig. 1: Framework for Binary Hypothesis-Testing
modeled the concept of categorization via quantiza-
tion of prior probabilities. In [11], Wimalajeewa and
Varshney have investigated the problem of collabora-
tive human decision making, where human agents are
modeled as likelihood-ratio decision rules with random
thresholds. More recently, Vempaty et al. have proposed
a coding theory based framework in [12] to improve
the performance of a distributed detection network with
human agents. Later, in [13], Vempaty et al. have pro-
posed a Bayesian hierarchical model for the distributed
detection framework to capture the uncertainty in the
behavior of human teams.
In contrast to the past work, we consider the problem
of decision making by an individual human agent in
the context of binary hypothesis testing. We assume
that the decision-making of these individual human
agents can be represented by prospect theory models,
and therefore, they make decisions that minimize their
behavioral risk, which is defined using prospect theory.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
considers the problem of prospect theory based decision
making for binary hypothesis testing. We investigate the
structure of optimal decision rules employed by two
special types of behavioral agents, namely optimists
and pessimists [14], under two different conditions
depending on the decision costs incurred at the agent.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
Consider a binary hypothesis-testing framework with
a behavioral decision-maker, as shown in Figure 1,
where the true hypothesis is denoted by θ ∈ {0, 1}.
Let pi0 and pi1 denote the prior probabilities of the
hypotheses θ = 0 and θ = 1 respectively. We assume
that the decision-maker receives a real-valued signal
r ∈ R from the phenomenon-of-interest (PoI) with
conditional distribution p(r|θ) and processes it to make
an inference u about the true hypothesis θ.
In this paper, the rationality of the decision-maker
is modeled using prospect theory [3], where the be-
havioral agent cognitively distorts the probabilities and
costs using known weight and value functions respec-
tively. In other words, any given probability ρ and any
given cost c are perceived as w(ρ) and v(c) respectively,
where w(·) is the weight function and v(·) is the value
function in the behavioral model. Our goal is to design
an optimal decision rule that optimizes the behavioral
risk at the decision maker.
In this paper, we assume that the decision maker
employs the following decision rule:
u =
{
1; if r ∈ R
0; otherwise,
(1)
where R is the acceptance region of the hypothesis
θ. The performance of the decision rule, as given in
Equation (1), is given by
x = Pr(u = 1|θ = 0) =
∫
R
p(r|θ = 0)dr, (2a)
y = Pr(u = 1|θ = 1) =
∫
R
p(r|θ = 1)dr, (2b)
where p(r|θ = 0) and p(r|θ = 1) are the conditional
pdfs of the observation r under the two hypotheses θ =
0, 1 respectively.
Given that the decision maker makes an inference
u = i when the true hypothesis is θ = j, we assume
that the decision maker incurs a cost cij for any i, j ∈
{0, 1}. Therefore, the behavioral risk due to the decision
rule given in Equation (1), is defined below:
f(R) =
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
w[Pr(u = i, θ = j)] · v(cij). (3)
Assuming that the decision maker always wishes
to minimize its behavioral risk f(R), we present the
following problem statement.
Problem 1. Find the optimal acceptance regionR∗ that
minimizes f(R) over all possible subsets of R.
Instead of representing a decision rule using its
corresponding acceptance regionR, one can also equiv-
alently parameterize the performance of the decision
rule using two variables: x = Pr(u = 1|θ = 0) and
y = Pr(u = 1|θ = 1), as defined in Equation (2). In
such a case, the behavioral risk as given in Equation
(3), can be rewritten as follows.
f(x, y) = g(x) + h(y), (4)
where
g(x) = w[pi0(1− x)]v(c00) + w[pi0x]v(c10), (5a)
h(y) = w[pi1(1− y)]v(c01) + w[pi1y]v(c11). (5b)
Furthermore, note that both x and y increase as
the size of the region R increases, since the area
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Fig. 2: Modeling Cognitive Bias using Prospect Theory
under both the conditional distributions p(x|θ = 0)
and p(x|θ = 1) changes concurrently with the region
R. Furthermore, from Caratheodary theorem [15], we
know that any ROC curve can be made concave by
allowing randomization of decision rules. Therefore, in
this paper, we assume that y is a concave-increasing
function of x, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, with y(x = 0) = 0
and y(x = 1) = 1.
Note that the solution to the above problem depends
on the weight and the value functions which may even
make Problem 1 intractable to solve. Therefore, in the
following section, we present some basic assumptions
on the weight and value functions which have been
experimentally verified by several researchers in the
past literature [5].
III. BEHAVIORAL AGENTS AND THEIR PROPERTIES
Prospect theory models are defined using weight
and value functions. While the risk-seeking/risk-averse
nature of an agent is captured by the value function,
the optimism/pessimism of an agent is modeled us-
ing the weight function. For example, the fear of an
accident may make the probability of its occurrence
seem larger to a human decision-maker, than the true
probability of occurrence of an accident. Furthermore,
the risk-averse behavior of human agents drives them
to overvalue the cost of an accident. Prospect theory
has been experimentally studied by several economists
and psychologists, and is currently accepted universally
to model human behavior. In the rest of this section,
we present practical models for both weight and value
functions that have been verified extensively in the
literature.
In prospect theory, the distortion of probabilities due
to human behavior is modeled via weight functions.
These weight functions are bounded within the unit
square, with the line w(p) = p denoting the unbiased
cognitive behavior. The region above this line corre-
sponds to the region of optimism, while the region
below w(p) = p is known as the region of pessimism.
In most experimental studies1, as pointed out in Figure
2a, the weight functions have been observed to behave
in the following manner.
Property 1. There exists a unique p∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
the weight function w(p) is concave for all p < p∗, and
convex for all p ≥ p∗.
Note that, the agent is optimistic when p∗ = 1, and
the agent is pessimistic when p∗ = 0 [14]. Furthermore,
if the agent is optimistic, since the weight function is
always bounded within a unit square, w(p) is concave-
increasing for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, in the case
of pessimistic agents, the weight function is convex-
increasing for all p ∈ [0, 1].
On the other hand, the value functions are distortions
1For more details about why the weight function has these
properties in practice, the readers may refer to [16], [17] and
references therein.
4that the human agent perceives when they incur a
cost (or a reward). These functions are not necessarily
bounded, and are observed to be piecewise convex2, as
shown in Figure 2b. But, in this paper, we relax this to
a more general assumption, as defined below.
Property 2. v(c) is continuous and monotonically
increasing for any c ∈ R. Consequently, there exists
a unique point c∗ ∈ R such that v(c∗) = 0.
Note that the cost c∗ at which v(c∗) = 0 is well-
known as the reference point. The reference point c∗
plays a major role in the decision-making process,
and can be interpreted as a target/goal to any human
decision maker [18]. Consequently, any cost below the
reference point c∗ appears as profits, and any cost above
c∗ appears as losses to the human decision maker.
Although several human behaviors such as loss aversion
are attributed to the convexity of the value function, we
have considered some special agent models in this paper
which only rely on the continuity and monotonicity of
the value function, and the reference point c∗.
IV. OPTIMAL DETECTION RULES FOR OPTIMISTS
In this section, we assume that the behavioral agent
is optimistic as shown in Figure 3, and, therefore, the
weight function is concave increasing. In such a case,
we investigate two different scenarios depending on the
decision costs incurred at the agent, as shown below.
Type-1: c∗ ≤ min{c00, c01, c10, c11}
This is the case where even an optimist perceives
the costs of all the possible choices to be detrimental,
i.e., the decision costs of all the available choices are
perceived as losses. In other words, given a reference
point c∗, the optimist perceives a decision cost cij as
v(cij) ≥ 0, for all i, j ∈ {0, 1}. As a result, we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For all Type-1 optimists, f(x, y(x)) is a
concave function of x, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Proof: We differentiate Equation (5a) twice to
obtain the following.
d2g(x)
dx2
= pi20
{
d2w[pi0x]
dx2
v(c00) +
d2w[pi0(1− x)]
dx2
v(c10)
}
.
(6)
2Traditionally, value functions are defined over rewards, and
therefore, are assumed to be concave. In this paper, we define value
functions over costs (or negative rewards) in order to align with the
traditional definition of Bayes risk.
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Fig. 3: Weight Function for Optimistic Agents
Given that the behavioral agent is optimistic, we have
d2w[pi0x]
dx2
≤ 0, and d
2w[pi0(1− x)]
dx2
≤ 0. (7)
Since v(c00) and v(c10) are both non-negative, we have
d2g(x)
dx2
≤ 0.
Since both g(x) and h(y) have similar structure, we
also have
d2h(y)
dy2
≤ 0. Given that y is a concave
increasing function of x, h(y(x)) is a concave function
of x. Since f(x, y(x)) is the sum of two concave
functions g(x) and h(y(x)), the behavioral risk is a
concave function of x.
Given that the behavioral agent wishes to minimize
its risk f(x, y(x)), the optimal decision rule lies on the
extreme point of the ROC curve, i.e., (x, y) = (0, 0) or
(x, y) = (1, 1). Furthermore, if c00 = c11 = cL ≤ cU =
c01 = c10, we have
f(0, 0) = w(pi0)v(cL) + w(pi1)v(cU ), (8a)
f(1, 1) = w(pi0)v(cU ) + w(pi1)v(cL). (8b)
As a result, if pi0 ≥ 1
2
, we have w(pi0) ≥ w(pi1). So,
we have
f(1, 1)−f(0, 0) = [w(pi0)− w(pi1)]·[v(cU )− v(cL)] ≥ 0.
(9)
In other words, the behavioral agent chooses the oper-
ating point (1, 1) in the ROC, which is equivalent to a
decision rule where R = R, i.e., the behavioral agent
always decides u = 1.
5On the other hand, if pi0 <
1
2
, we have
f(1, 1)−f(0, 0) = [w(pi0)− w(pi1)]·[v(cU )− v(cL)] ≤ 0.
(10)
As a result, the behavioral agent adopts the operating
point (0, 0). This is equivalent to the case where the
behavioral agent always decides u = 0.
In summary, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If c∗ ≤ min{c00, c01, c10, c11}, an optimist
minimizes its behavioral risk by either always deciding
u = 0, or u = 1, for any observation x ∈ R.
Furthermore, if c00 = c11 = cL ≤ cU = c01 = c10,
then a Type-1 optimist employs the following decision
rule.
u =
1, if pi0 ≥
1
2
0, otherwise.
(11)
In summary, when all the decision costs appear detri-
mental to an optimist, the optimal decision rule is fixed,
and independent of data. Furthermore, in concurrence
to our intuition, whenever c00 = c11 = cL ≤ cU =
c01 = c10, the optimist optimally chooses the option
u0 ∈ {0, 1} that is antipodal to prior probabilities in
order to minimize its behavioral risk.
Type-2: c∗ ≥ max{c00, c01, c10, c11}
In contrast to Type-1 optimists, Type-2 optimists
interpret the same decision costs as being profitable. In
other words, given that the reference point c∗ lies above
all the decision costs, v(cij) ≤ 0, for all i, j ∈ {0, 1}.
As a result, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For all Type-2 optimists, f(x, y(x)) is a
convex function of x, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Proof: Proof is similar to that of Lemma 1, and is
therefore, omitted for the sake of brevity.
In other words, the behavioral agent minimizes its
risk at some intermediate operating point (x∗, y∗). In
the following theorem, we state the necessary condi-
tion that (x∗, y∗) will satisfy. We find this condition
by equating the first derivative of the risk function
f(x, y(x)) with respect to x to zero.
Theorem 2. The operating point (x∗, y∗) of the optimal
decision rule employed by a Type-2 optimist is a root
of the equation
dw[pi0x
∗]
dx
v(c10) +
dw[pi1y
∗(x∗)]
dx
v(c11)
=
dw[pi0(1− x∗)]
dx
v(c00) +
dw[pi1{1− y∗(x∗)}]
dx
v(c01).
(12)
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Fig. 4: Weight Function for Pessimistic Agents
Given that all the decision costs appear profitable
to a Type-2 optimist, it is intuitive that the agent
chooses a decision rule that minimizes its behavioral
risk. Theorem 2 presents the necessary condition to find
the optimal operating point for the Type-2 optimist.
V. OPTIMAL DETECTION RULES FOR PESSIMISTS
In this section, we assume that the behavioral agent
is pessimistic as shown in Figure 4, and therefore, the
weight function is convex increasing. More specifically,
we analyze the same two types of agents as discussed
in Section IV, within the context of pessimists.
Type-1: c∗ ≤ min{c00, c01, c10, c11}
As discussed in Section IV, we assume that a Type-1
pessimist also finds all its possible decision choices to
be detrimental. In other words, given that c∗ lies below
all the decision costs, v(cij) ≥ 0, for all i, j ∈ {0, 1}.
As a result, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For all Type-1 pessimists, f(x, y(x)) is a
convex function of x, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Proof: We differentiate Equation (5a) twice to
obtain the following.
d2g(x)
dx2
= pi20
{
d2w[pi0x]
dx2
v(c00) +
d2w[pi0(1− x)]
dx2
v(c10)
}
.
(13)
Given that the behavioral agent is pessimistic, we have
d2w[pi0x]
dx2
≥ 0, and d
2w[pi0(1− x)]
dx2
≥ 0. (14)
6Since v(c00) and v(c10) are both non-negative, we have
d2g(x)
dx2
≥ 0.
Since both g(x) and h(y) have a similar structure,
we also have
d2h(y)
dy2
≥ 0. Given that y is a convex
increasing function of x, h(y(x)) is a convex function
of x. Since f(x, y(x)) is the sum of two convex
functions g(x) and h(y(x)), the behavioral risk is a
convex function of x.
In other words, the behavioral agent minimizes its
risk at some intermediate operating point (x∗, y∗),
which satisfies the following necessary condition. We
find this condition by equating the first derivative of the
risk function f(x, y(x)) with respect to x to zero.
Theorem 3. The operating point (x∗, y∗) of the optimal
decision rule employed by a Type-1 pessimist is a root
of the equation
dw[pi0x
∗]
dx
v(c10) +
dw[pi1y
∗(x∗)]
dx
v(c11)
=
dw[pi0(1− x∗)]
dx
v(c00) +
dw[pi1{1− y∗(x∗)}]
dx
v(c01).
(15)
Note that our results in Theorem 3 are contrary to
that of a Type-1 optimist, and resemble that of Theorem
2. Although all the decision costs appear detrimental,
due to the pessimistic nature of the agent, the agent
will attempt to find the optimal rule that satisfies the
necessary condition stated in Theorem 3.
Type-2: c∗ ≥ max{c00, c01, c10, c11}
As stated in Section IV, we assume that all the
decision costs appear profitable to the agent. In other
words, the agent’s reference point c∗ lies above all the
decision costs, v(cij) ≤ 0, for all i, j ∈ {0, 1}. As a
result, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For all Type-2 pessimists, f(x, y(x)) is a
concave function of x, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Proof: Proof is similar to that of Lemma 1, and is
therefore, omitted for the sake of brevity.
Given that the behavioral agent wishes to minimize
its risk f(x, y(x)), the optimal decision rule lies on the
extreme point of the ROC curve, i.e., (x, y) = (0, 0) or
(x, y) = (1, 1). Furthermore, if c00 = c11 = cL ≤ cU =
c01 = c10, we have
f(0, 0) = w(pi0)v(cL) + w(pi1)v(cU ), (16a)
f(1, 1) = w(pi0)v(cU ) + w(pi1)v(cL). (16b)
As a result, if pi0 ≥ 1
2
, we have w(pi0) ≥ w(pi1). So,
we have
f(1, 1)−f(0, 0) = [w(pi0)− w(pi1)]·[v(cU )− v(cL)] ≥ 0.
(17)
In other words, the behavioral agent chooses the oper-
ating point (1, 1) in the ROC, which is equivalent to a
decision rule where R = R, i.e., the behavioral agent
always decides u = 1.
On the other hand, if pi0 <
1
2
, we have
f(1, 1)−f(0, 0) = [w(pi0)− w(pi1)]·[v(cU )− v(cL)] ≤ 0.
(18)
As a result, the behavioral agent adopts the operating
point (0, 0). This is equivalent to the case where the
behavioral agent always decides u = 0.
In summary, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. If c∗ ≥ min{c00, c01, c10, c11}, a pessimist
minimizes its behavioral risk by either always deciding
u = 0, or u = 1, for any observation x ∈ R.
Furthermore, if c00 = c11 = cL ≤ cU = c01 = c10,
then a Type-2 pessimist employs the following decision
rule.
u =
1, if pi0 ≥
1
2
0, otherwise.
(19)
In summary, even though a Type-2 pessimist finds
all the decision costs to be profitable, the agent still
chooses a data-independent decision rule. Particularly,
when c00 = c11 = cL ≤ cU = c01 = c10, the
Type-2 pessimist chooses a decision that is antipodal
to the prior information, just as in the case of a Type-1
optimist.
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, we consider a simple example where
the observation r follows a normal distribution with
mean θ and unit variance, where θ denotes the state of
the true hypothesis. We assume that the true decision
costs incurred by the human agent are given by c00 =
c11 = cL = −1 and c01 = c10 = cU = 1. In such a
case, the optimal Bayesian detection rule is given by
u =
1; if x ≥
pi0
pi1
0; otherwise,
(20)
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Fig. 5: Optimal decision rules employed by the human agent under different prior probabilities
and the corresponding optimal Bayes risk is given by
B(x, y) =
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
Pr(u = i, θ = j) · cij
= pi0[x · 1 + (1− x) · (−1)]
+pi1[(1− y) · 1 + y · (−1)]
= pi0(2x− 1) + pi1(1− 2y),
(21)
where x = Q
(
pi0
pi1
)
and y = Q
(
pi0
pi1
− θ
)
.
To illustrate our results obtained in Sections IV
and V, we consider the following model for a human
decision-maker and present optimal decision rules for
both Type-1 and Type-2 optimists and pessimists.
w(p) = pα, ∀ p ∈ [0, 1] and α > 0, (22a)
v(c) = ec − ec∗ , ∀ c ∈ R, (22b)
where α and c∗ are the agent’s behavioral parameters.
More specifically, α > 1 if the agent is a pessimist,
α = 1 if the agent is unbiased, and 0 < α < 1 if the
agent is an optimist. Similarly, c∗ is the reference cost of
the human decision-maker, as discussed in Section III.
Assuming that the human agent employs a likelihood-
ratio test, we have the following ROC curve.
y = Q
(
Q−1(x)− θ) . (23)
Using this example, we present the operating points
adopted by both optimists and pessimists in Figure 5, by
obtaining the optimal rules using the gradient descent
algorithm. In order to illustrate the results for both
Type-1 and Type-2 agents, we present numerical results
for two scenarios: (i) pi0 = 0.25 and (ii) pi0 = 0.75.
Note that, in the first scenario when pi0 = 0.25, the
optimal operating points for both Type-1 optimist and
Type-2 pessimist lie at (1, 1), which corroborates our
theoretical analysis. We also observe a similar behavior
with both Type-1 optimists and Type-2 pessimists when
pi0 = 0.75, where the operating points lie at (0, 0). In
contrast, in the case of Type-2 optimists and Type-1
pessimists, we observe that the optimal decision rules
from a behavioral perspective lie at different operating
points, and also deviate from the Bayesian detector.
Furthermore, since Bayesian decision rules are not
necessarily optimal from a behavioral perspective, our
results illustrate how prospect theory based decision
rules deviate from the Bayesian decision rule.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigated optimal binary hypoth-
esis testing rules employed by two types of prospect
theory based optimists and pessimists. We found that
the optimal decision rule employed by an optimist or a
pessimist can significantly deviate from the rule which
is designed to minimize the Bayes risk. In the future,
we will analyze other types of agents and obtain their
corresponding optimal decision rules. Note that, in the
real world, a typical human agent is neither an optimist,
nor a pessimist, and is known to exhibit more complex
behavior. Therefore, we will consider behavioral models
beyond optimists/pessimists that closely mimic human
agents and find optimal decision rules employed by
such human agents.
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